Rodolph CaTnap rejects any kind of synthetic knowledge and his main reason in doing so is that any kind of understanding of a priori theory of
synthetic sense on the basis of experimental researchabillity and verification is impossible. According to this approach any theorem which can not be
subjected to experimental verification is indeed a nonsense pseudo theorem and hence is void of sense. This kind of theorem despite the fact that
apparently explains a problem, but indeed it is a preudo-proposition which usually comes about as a result of ambiguitions which are inherent in a
natural language. Yet it should be known that the application of logical analysis of language to these theorems reveals that actually there was no
problem in the first place, and therefore the fallacy of these kinds of theorems becomes clear.
Despite the fact that Carnap is of the idea that mathematical laws enjoy a
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necessary truth and therefore do not belong to the domain of generalization of experimental ordinances, yet he does not believe that they are capable of
negating experimentalism. This is because, he further observes that, these types of laws are analytic and their thruth or the lack of it can only be known
by clarifying the underlying senses of the constituent terms of those
ordinances.
The fundamental truths of logic which from the criterion for analysis are based on the definitions of inplicatures of their constituent terms and words.
CaTnap's theory regarding the rejection of a priori synthetic law is based on the principle of experimental verification and the distinction between the
analytic and synthetic canons. The principle of experimental verification has been strongly refuted and it only survives nominally in the study of the history
of philosophy. CaTnap utilizing the method of logical analysis of language has not successeded to prove the nonsensical nature of some of the outstanding
metaphysical systems, and the examples of metaphysics taken up and analyzed
by him have been mainly borrowed from the works of Hegel and Heideyger. Therefore, it could be claimed that, in a sense, his criticism is indeed directed
to the German idealist philosophy.
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